A Presuppositional Critique of Constructivism by Rickert, Paul R
Liberty University
DigitalCommons@Liberty
University
Faculty Publications and Presentations Helms School of Government
Fall 2007
A Presuppositional Critique of Constructivism
Paul R. Rickert
Liberty University, paulrickert@letu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/gov_fac_pubs
Part of the Other Philosophy Commons, and the Social and Philosophical Foundations of
Education Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Helms School of Government at DigitalCommons@Liberty University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Liberty University. For more
information, please contact scholarlycommunication@liberty.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rickert, Paul R., "A Presuppositional Critique of Constructivism" (2007). Faculty Publications and Presentations. Paper 41.
http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/gov_fac_pubs/41
Critiquing Constructivism, 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Presuppositional Critique of Constructivism 
 
 
 Paul R. Rickert, M.S., M.C.J. 
Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice 
Liberty University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fall 2007
Critiquing Constructivism, 2 
 
Abstract 
Educational theories have roots. They have roots in broader philosophies, conceptions of 
the nature of reality, and the theories utilized in classrooms to teach have implications for 
broader society. Specifically, this paper discusses the problems of constructivist theory in the 
classroom. 
The author takes a presuppostitional view and shows that all systems have most basic 
beliefs which are un-provable. So at the heart of any form of interpretive schema is faith in that 
schema. The author discusses ontological and epistemological options and how shifts in 
philosophy change the order of the most basic beliefs, but not the fact that they are beliefs, 
nonetheless. The author discusses the role of theories of truth, and how a fact-constructivism 
embraces a relativist position that is self-refuting and ultimately untenable absent a suspension of 
laws of logic. The author argues in favor of revelation from God as axiomatic and demonstrates 
how logic can exist on that basis, whereas on a secular basis, philosophy cannot generate any 
True facts whatsoever.  The author then looks at the educational theory of constructivism and 
examines the theory and the classroom practices it endorses it in light of the presuppositional 
critique. 
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When a “theory of everything” or a meta-narrative is set forth, an author stands in one 
paradigm while wishing to destroy that one while creating a new one. Constructivist theorists do 
this very thing when they stand on the shoulders of traditional theorists with regard to logical 
argumentation, the notion of the value of persuasion, and purposiveness (writing a book to 
inform others, make money, and arguably believing themselves correct) but in doing so, 
essentially knock their own foundations out from beneath themselves. Their own theory does not 
give them impetus to say anything about the theory.  
When philosophical constructivism is extended into the realm of education (yielding the 
educational theory called constructivism) the philosophy sets forth specific practices. While 
these are ideologically supported, they seem to have less research based support.  
The argument that set forth is a presuppositional one. Specifically, that it is one’s 
presuppositions that characterize and even constrains acceptance of one meta-narrative or 
another. Everyone accepts some form of meta-narrative (even those who rail against meta-
narratives have one of their own). It is vital to think on the level of presuppositions (or axioms) 
because these always play an important, yet often hidden role in discourse. Schlossberg clearly 
illustrates the importance of understanding assumptions and their role: 
Assumptions, in fact, are more powerful than assertions, because they 
bypass the critical faculty and thereby create prejudice. If someone argues the 
proposition that modern intellectual people do not believe in religious dogmas, I 
am able to judge whether his arguments are persuasive. The simple act of 
listening to an argument is almost enough to engage it. But if I listen to someone 
discourse on a related subject in a way that only assumes that modern intellectual 
people do not believe religious dogmas, my mind tends to accept the assumption 
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and bypasses it in order to engage the argument which, in fact, depends on it. That 
bypassed assumption is the pocket of enemy soldiers that was ignored in an effort 
to engage the main body of the adversary, and it lies in wait to strike from the 
rear. A false assumption can be combined with an unassailable argument, which 
then proves the truth of what is false. The false assumption is additionally 
beguiling because it often appeals to one of the worst instincts – the desire to be 
fashionable or at least to avoid being associated with the unfashionable or the 
unpopular (1990, pp. 210-211). 
 A priori human mental endowments must exist for learning to take place (Clark, 1968, p. 
57). If, as the empiricists argue, even the law of non-contradiction is empirically discoverable,  
little has been gleaned from Nietzsche, Dewey and Sartre; empirical discoveries can never be 
laws as experience can never give universal judgments; mankind is constrained by its temporal 
nature, only knowing the past (ibid). Therefore, this argument assumes a priori endowments1. 
Given this assumption the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis on which much of constructivism rests - that 
“language precedes thought” - is incomplete2. The question must be raised, how is anything, 
including language, even learnable at all? The only possibility is that at least some a priori 
endowment exists. Most notably, the author would argue, is that mankind is equipped with 
memory, classification, recognition/attribution faculties, and logic (inductive and deductive 
                                                 
1 For Durkheim, this was Cultural Collective Representations & Mental Collective Representations; for Mead this 
was social interaction or language and meaning (Bergesen, 2004, p. 2). Both accept a materialist presupposition; the 
idea that we are composed solely of matter, and the organic “brain secretes thought like the liver produces bile” 
(Pierre Cabanis). I reject this presupposition in favor of the notion that my soul or mind is who I am and it animates 
my body. 
 
2 The second and third propositions are that “Language is not a given” and “Language is culturally determined”. The 
three propositions create a both a “linguistic determinism” and a “linguistic relativity”. I would argue that language 
did not arise out of a social need, but God endowed Adam with this for him to name the animals, but more 
importantly so that Adam could talk with God, and vice versa.  Even after the Tower of Babel incident, language 
(whichever one spoke) corresponded to a meaning in the mind that was communicated. Language does change as 
technology and culture change, but nonetheless it still communicates meaning. 
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reasoning capabilities). Some forms of the way people think are socially constructed to be sure, 
but to argue that only a surface reality3 exists, the reality of everyday life in Berger and 
Luckmann’s terms, and to ignore the full range of worldview options is naïve for the 
presuppositionalist. Van Til would assert that both Christians and non-Christians employ logic, 
but non-Christians employ it to suppress the truth (Rom. 1:18) (as discussed in Frame, 2004). 
Both use the same laws of logic, but the non-Christian has “no basis for believing that the laws 
of logic apply to reality” (ibid). 
 Essentially, what people believe about ontology (being or beings), epistemology 
(knowing), hermeneutics (interpretive methods) and axiology (valuations) and the manner in 
which thinkers order them, or give them primacy, dictate the kinds of answers one can arrive at 
regarding all of life. This is what is called worldview (Weltanschauung). Each decision on the 
basic questions provides an axiom and leads to other axioms based on those foundational beliefs. 
Foundational beliefs are just that, beliefs; they are non-provable. So in some respects, perhaps 
Rorty was right when he said that truth is “what our peers will let us get away with saying” (as 
quoted in Plantinga, 1982, p. 50). While one cannot act as if presuppositions are provable, it is 
possible to make arguments in favor of and demonstrate coherence and validity, and demonstrate 
that they are valuable in interpreting the world. The question is, are presuppositions being 
considered by those who hold them? Are they useful in making sense of the world or reason and 
experience; the world that is known? As Gordon Haddon Clark puts it, “…can we assert creation 
without implying something about zoology? No, truth is not thus disjointed. It is systematic. And 
by the systems they produce, axioms must be judged (emphasis added) (1968, p. 60). 
Ontological Options 
                                                 
3 Throughout the paper I will use small r-reality and capital R-Reality to represent perceived or subjective reality 
and ultimate Reality respectively. Also truth and Truth will be used to indicate subjective truth and ultimate 
conception of Truth respectively. 
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 Ontology basically deals with the questions “Who am I?” and “How do I exist?” (Martin, 
2006). The answers to these questions could be wildly divergent, and historically this can be seen 
in various faith systems, both religious and non-religious. But essentially, whether one examines 
a Babylonian creation epic or is reading a modern attempt to explain big bang cosmology, there 
are still the same two options, a super-naturalistic or a naturalistic explanation (Ibid, p. 19). 
One’s choice in this regard dramatically affects choices in the other arenas. Subsequently people 
accept ideas about the type of special or natural creation we live in, and the type of creator or 
process that brought about this world, but this is beyond the scope of this paper. T.S. Eliot gives 
the options quite clearly, “Either everything in man can be traced as a development from below 
or something must come from above” (as quoted in Schlossberg, 1990, p. 174). 
 Typical options (see Appendix A) regarding questions of ontology begin with the 
concepts of Ontological Realism (that a world exists independent of human cognition, thought, 
or speech processes) and Ontological Idealism (that “the world” is a construct of human 
cognition and thought) (Appendix A). In the end these choices are based upon personal decisions 
with regard to the broader category, natural or supernatural. The supernatural option, leads the 
author to assume a Creator. The Biblical concept of the Creator God is most compelling on 
numerous levels, and thus answers to the subsequent ontological issues are developed on that 
basis. Ontological Realism seems most appropriate to the author because when a person’s noetic 
activity ceases, the world continues and that is because a “proposition exists because God thinks 
or conceives it” (Plantinga, 1982, p. 70). So in some sense I accept a form of constructivism of 
Reality, in that God constructs it by His thought. He creates a proposition by thinking/speaking it 
and thusly He also believes its truth. Plantiga argues that the most sensible anti-realists are 
Biblical theists (ibid).  
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So to clarify: Ones choice regarding a NATURALISTIC or SUPER-NATURALISTIC 
Ontology lead to choices regarding a real or ideal ontology of the world (creation).  
Epistemic Options 
 The concept of “how we know anything at all” and on “what basis we accept that 
knowledge” is not as straightforward as the ontological options. To clarify the concept, John 
Peifer (as quoted in Naugle, 2005, p. 321) states “Do we, in knowing, by means of what is 
thought, attain to things, to realities which enjoy an independence in physical existence outside 
of thought, or do we by knowing attain only to what is in thought?” Peifer continues, “Does 
thinking terminate in things or in thought?” (ibid).  Plato attempted to answer this question in 
Republic, Book VII with The Allegory of the Cave. Briefly, Plato’s argument is that people are 
like chained prisoners who can only view in one direction, toward the wall of the cave they are 
within. There burns a fire behind them illuminating objects and their own shadows. This is all 
they know and all they can know, but do not realize that there is a real thing, a so-called Platonic 
“form” that is what is really real, and they only see the shadows (Plato).4 
 Plato’s answer to the question is that human thinking ends in representations of things, 
and “if the prisoners are released and disabused of their error” that they would actually see and 
know what is really Real (ibid). Of course Plato’s point is that people need to be ruled by 
philosopher-kings (like himself) so they can be released in wise manner from their slavery. Plato 
answered his epistemological question based on his ontology. This pattern (deal with ontology 
first, then epistemology derived therefrom; followed by hermeneutics, etc.) basically held true 
until the Enlightenment. It is at this point we see a shift in primacy from being to knowing, or 
rather, from ontology as primary, to epistemology as primary. Knowing came to precede being, 
as Descartes placed the rational self as the foundation of knowledge with “Cogito ergo sum” (“I 
                                                 
4 “The Matrix Trilogy” movies put this concept in vivid detail, albeit with extensive artistic license. 
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think therefore I am”) (Sire, 2004, p. 216). Thinking and rationalism (not mere rationality) 
become the hallmarks of the Modern world. In science this worked wonders, but in philosophy 
the result was more dismal.  
 Hume raises the question “How is it that we know anything?” and Kant attempts to 
answer him. The effect though is “exalting the knowing self to the position of ‘creating’ reality” 
(ibid, p. 218). Nietzsche furthers the Cartesian argument and questions the certainty of the 
existing self. “What if it is the thinking that creates or causes the I rather than the I that causes 
the thinking?” (ibid). So as Sire points out, we shift again “from knowing to meaning” and 
knowledge can no longer be a basis for anything and truth (and Truth) vanishes (2004, p. 217). 
“In the absence of truth there is only power” (conversation with Dr. David Beck, October 9, 
2007) as justice vanishes when truth does. It is this power that postmodernists typically focus on. 
Truth and truths are “power” and “the authority to determine what counts as true is also the 
power to determine who counts as important” (White, p. 55). This plays an important role in 
educational philosophy as one might imagine. So essentially there is a shift in what is seen as the 
philosophical first question. The Pre-moderns structured philosophy in the following manner: 
ontology ? epistemology ? hermeneutics; the Modernist in emphasizing knowledge changed 
the order to epistemology ? ontology ? hermeneutics; the Postmodern era now emphasizes 
meaning which reorients the questions again to hermeneutics ? ontology ? epistemology.  
 The position that Plato ends with is what might be called naïve realism or common-sense 
realism. The notion is that meaning is found in a “’vertical’ relation between terms and their 
referents” or rather, words correspond directly with Reality (Sayer, as quoted in Nightingale and 
Cromby, 2002, p. 703). Naugle discusses variations on this concept of ideas in the mind and their 
existence outside a person’s mental concept. He argues that there are three options with regard to 
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epistemology; naïve realism, creative anti-realism, and critical realism (see a typical options 
chart in Appendix A – although only two options are present). The following premises 
describing the positions are from his book Worldview: The History of a Concept (2002, pp. 322-
324). 
Naïve Realism 
1) an objective, independent reality exists; 
2) the character of this reality is fixed and independent of any observer; 
3) human knowers have trustworthy cognitive capacities by which to apprehend this 
fixed reality unencumbered by personal prejudices and traditions;  
4) truth and knowledge about the world are discovered and certain, not invented and 
relative 
Creative Anti-Realism 
1) while an external world may, and probably does exist, its objective character 
remains forever obscure; 
2) human knowers lack epistemic access to apprehend the world as it is in itself 
3) what poses as reality is linguistically constructed, an idealistic product of the 
human mind; 
4) consequently, truth and knowledge about the world are not discovered and 
certain, but invented and relative. 
Critical Realism 
1) an objective, independent reality exists; 
2) the character of this reality is fixed and independent of any observer; 
3) human knowers have trustworthy cognitive capacities by which to apprehend this 
fixed reality, but the influences of personal prejudices and worldview traditions 
conditions or relativizes the knowing process; 
4) truth and knowledge about the world, therefore, are partially discovered and 
certain, and partially invented and relative.  
 
So the Naïve Realist would answer the question, “can we know truth it itself” (ding-an-
sich) in the affirmative. The Creative Anti-Realist would also answer in the affirmative, in that 
truth is created within the subject, so in that sense, we can truly know what we create (truth is 
subject-laden), but the Critical Realist would answer both yes and no. “Yes” in that we have 
epistemic access to the truth, and it is Real, but “no”, in that there are subjective elements to 
reality (they are perspectival due to the finiteness of human beings), and sin nature constrains the 
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ability to know completely as sinners are biased against the truth. Again, the importance of 
revelation is illustrated.  
Van Til argues that those who do not believe in revelation “can and do argue logically, 
but do so on borrowed capital” (in Frame, 2000).  The theistic Critical Realist would also parallel 
each proposition mentioned above with the following concepts 1) God thinks/spoke this Reality, 
so it is Real; 2) God is unchanging; 3) mankind is created in the image of God (logic) but the fall 
of man affects his faculties; 4) Scripture assumes Truth but the Apostle Paul becomes “all things 
to all men” (I Cor. 9:22) indicating the subjective nature of some truth in reality. This is also seen 
in 1 Cor. 13:12, where Paul states “For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face; now 
I know in part, but then I will know fully just as I also have been fully known.” 
Truth? What is Truth? 
Aristotle, in defining truth stated, “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it 
is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true (Stanford). So 
to Aristotle, truth is a subjective acknowledgment of what actually is. This is known as the 
correspondence theory of truth. The correspondence theorist would argue that absolute or 
objective Truth is out there and the human faculties can know it. This is also essentially the 
Platonic or naïve realist conceptualization of truth. 
 Looking at the chart in Appendix A, one can see that there are two other theories noted. 
Again, the chart is incomplete5 and not reflecting all ways of knowing, just three of the more 
popular ones. It is largely on the correspondence theory of truth that constructivism levels its 
most devastating attack. Putnam mentions that there is “no ‘God’s-eye view’ from which we 
might compare our utterances to the world” (as quoted in Nightingale, p. 703). This is something 
                                                 
5 I am not trying to set up this chart in Appendix A as authoritative and then strike it down in a straw-man argument, 
but I am seeking to merely demonstrate that many philosophers do not completely understand the nature of 
presuppositions as demonstrated by the prevalence of incomplete charts of this sort. 
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unknowable, people can only make more or less compelling argument in favor of one 
perspective or another. Arguments are more or less compelling based on our presuppositions 
regarding the nature of man, knowledge, reality, and terminate in unproven assumptions 
(axioms) about the way things are that collectively maintain a semblance of logic and define our 
conceptual schemes.  
 Clark is correct, that secular philosophy has failed in that it could not establish the law of 
non-contradiction (p. 64). According to current secular trends in philosophy, objects can be both 
true and false in the same given situation, undoing almost 2500 years of philosophy and denying 
what most experience in everyday life; namely pink is not blue and that 1+1≠11.   
 The typical understanding of truth is justified, true, belief. Thus, it would be written 
logically accordingly: 
Any thinker T, knows p, if and only if 
1. T believes p; 
2. T is justified in believing p; 
3. p is true 
 
The major issue is that postmodern thought is destroying objectivity about facts; justification, 
and rational explanation, and in so doing it destroys the possibility of any knowledge or truth at 
all (Boghossian, pp. 15-24). There is only relativism about everything, including logic. As 
Boghossian, (p. 40) points out; the social constructivist picture of reality is as follows:  
1. Since we have socially constructed that p, therefore p. 
2. And since it is possible that another community should have constructed the 
fact that not-p, then possibly not-p; 
3. So, it is possible that both p and not-p. 
Critiquing Constructivism, 12 
 
 
He continues,  
How could it be the case both that the first Americans originated in Asia 
and that they did not originate there but originated instead in a 
subterranean world of spirits? How could it be the case both that the world 
is flat (the fact constructed by pre-Aristotelian Greeks) and that it is round 
(the fact constructed by us) (ibid)? 
 
The idea that truth is socially constructed essentially does away with any possibility 
about any facts at all; truth is gone, because constructivism (specifically fact-constructivism) 
stands contrary to the law of non-contradiction. But how can this law of logic be established if 
modern secular philosophy has destroyed the possibility of it? It cannot and there is only 
irrationalism that remains. Turning again to Clark’s presuppositional argument of axiomatic 
revelation, John 1:1 states, “In the Beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and 
the Word was God.”  The term translated “Word” is the Koine Greek Logos. This is from where 
the word logic derives. Christ is the Logos, “the definition, the theory, the argument, the 
principle of law, the sentence, the wisdom … so in the beginning was, the Logic” (Clark, p. 67).  
Logic therefore is the description of how God thinks. Demonstrating this concept, Stephen 
Charnock (as quoted in Clark, p. 66) states, “God knows himself because his knowledge with his 
will is the cause of all other things.” 
 The law of non-contradiction merely explains the manner in which reality, as created by 
God’s thinking, works. The thoughts in the Bible are the thoughts of God (1 Cor. 2:16 – “We 
have the mind of Christ”; Phil. 2:5 – “Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus.”). 
So men have a priori rational endowment as God’s nature is rationality. We are created in his 
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image (imagio dei) and are “the expression on a created level of the internal coherence of God’s 
nature” and “the science of logic seeks to discover the principles (such as the law of non-
contradiction) for correct inferences and correct judgments of consistency” (Frame, 2004). 
Historical Approach 
 For purposes of describing the various philosophical options, a brief historical recounting 
of conceptual changes and the resulting shifts in culture is warranted. A rather common 
breakdown is; pre-modernity, modernity, and post-modernity. Pre-moderns characteristically 
accepted the authority of the church and hence there is an acceptance of the status quo with 
regard to the available answers to the basic questions; ontology – God created and mankind 
exists within that creation and can know it. This is typically accepted because the authority of the 
church and the truth of the Scriptures were acknowledged because “what was needed for both 
knowledge and virtue could be found in the resources of tradition” (White, p. 25). Education was 
rare and typically was focused on a study of authoritative texts, not critical studies or 
experimentation (ibid, p. 26).  So Premoderns ultimately placed their faith in authority; Moderns 
lost their faith in authority and placed it in human reason around the time of the enlightenment; 
finally, the Postmoderns kept the Modern distrust of authority but lost their faith in reason and 
have found nothing to replace their faith (ibid, p. 41).  
Pre-modernity ? Modernity ? Post-modernity 
The Cartesian foundational proposition Cogito ergo sum sets up the Modern era; an era in 
which most philosophers believed certain truths were actually self-evident (Boghossian, 2006, p. 
116). Descartes and Locke were both convinced of the reasoning power of the human mind to 
solve the deepest questions plaguing humanity (White, 2006, p. 31). Prior to this, most 
knowledge in Western society was religiously derived, in that the Bible was the basis for what 
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was sure. For Pre-moderns, the idea “was for the Biblical text to shape the worldview of the 
reader” (White, p. 118).  But Descartes’ desire to find complete intellectual certitude was fatal to 
what Kant called the “Cartesian revolution” and what has become known as Modernism. Too 
much faith (not proof, again emphasizing the presuppositional nature of axioms) was placed in 
the ability of the human mind (Sire, 1997). Sire (p. 236) points out that God claims to be “I AM 
WHO I AM” - the self existing, self-referential one (c.f. Exodus 3:14). The rationalist approach 
says that there is reality and we can know it of our own inherent rationality. This has come under 
intense scrutiny (by both pre-moderns and post-moderns) after the failure of modernity to 
actually create the better world it promised since the Enlightenment. Progress has never occurred 
in the utopian manner of the modern context. The constructivist approach responds and asks how 
you even know there is Reality outside of our subjectively created reality (i.e. creative anti-
realism). All that can be said is that the only reality that is even knowable is that which we 
create. The critical realist admits fallibility in knowledge (as Kuhn so aptly demonstrates in The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions) but adheres to the existence of an objective reality (contra-
Kuhn who was an anti-foundationalist). So one can see a pre-modern, to modern, to post-modern 
transition that in reality can be balanced out by reversion to the pre-modern notion that there is 
objective truth and reality - but these things are only knowable from a finite perspective. There is 
a blend of the rational and objective with the subjective; honoring both the Logos (definition – 
who is Christ) and the subjective created being in his or her context. It is a reorientation from an 
overemphasis on objectivity (modernity) and an overemphasis of subjectivity (post-modernity). 
Problems with Constructivism in Particular 
 Schlossberg criticizes the social constructivist position in that it “always has the 
environment precede the idea, even when it cannot provide evidence for that order” (1990, p. 
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154). Constructivists Berger and Luckmann admit that they take their root proposition from 
Marx; specifically “that man’s consciousness is determined by his social being” (1967, pp. 5-6). 
The issue with this sort of formulation is that there is another assumption, that history is the same 
as nature (another derivative of Marx’s materialism). Reinhold Niebuhr criticizes this in The 
Irony of American History, calling it “naïve belief”. The idea that methods used in understanding 
nature can be used in studying human action and interaction is naïve according to Niebuhr (i.e. it 
is a category error). But this should be no surprise as most social scientists begin with 
presuppositions of the Natural (rather than supernatural) and hence “mind is a product of 
material origin or that human behavior is completely contingent on prior experiences” 
(Schlossberg, p. 153). “The habitat accounts for the opinions of the thinker and explains why his 
ideas are different from those of another person who lives in a different habitat” (ibid). 
Schlossberg continues: 
The all-inclusiveness of the system [social constructivism] makes it 
invulnerable to refutation, regardless of the evidence adduced… All arguments 
are turned back as further evidence that the speaker is bound by the determining 
influence… which Mannheim admits is a “means for side-stepping the 
discussion”… Such imperviousness to refutation, far from being a sign of 
strength, is further evidence that these disciplines are not the sciences they claim 
to be (p. 156). 
 
Karl Popper levies strong criticism of constructivism by arguing, according to the theory, 
that the entire theory might simply be expression of the class interests of those who advocate this 
theory (1971, p. 243). This is actually quite amusing as it might be the only critique that actually 
can not be subsumed by the theory. 
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So, to illustrating that constructivism is more of a faith system than a scientific enterprise, 
the following summation of the presuppositions is offered (from Schlossberg, 1990; Naugle, 
2002; Plantinga, 1982; White, 2006; Sire, 2004; Boghossian, 2007):   
• Constructivism assumes the truth of its root proposition (a la Marx). 
• Constructivism assumes a value-free social science (Schlossberg, p. 155). 
• Constituents of constructivism unjustifiably exempt social constructivism from its own 
relativization (ibid). 
• Constituents of constructivism use logic and persuasion but disprove the truth of logic; 
the theorist falls prey to his theory (c.f. White, 2007, p. 82). 
• Telling others about social constructivism is meaningless, if one assumes the truth of the 
system. 
• Constituents of constructivism attempt to include worldviews in their analysis (Berger 
specifically), but fail to see their own perspective as a worldview, and removes 
constructivism from the criticism it levies on others (Naugle, p. 233). 
• Berger’s constructivism conflates a difference in representation with a difference in the 
thing represented (i.e. he mistakes “different worlds” for “differences in belief about the 
world”). 
• Constructivism is “hugely empowering. If we can be said to know up front that any item 
of knowledge only has that status because it gets a nod from our contingent social values, 
then any claim to knowledge can be dispatched if we happen not to share the values on 
which it allegedly depends” (Boghossian, p. 130). For the postmodern thinker “grammar 
is power: whoever controls the rules and ordinary usages of a language controls what can 
be thought” (White, 2007, p. 99). 
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• Constructivism asserts that the “powerful can not criticize the oppressed, because the 
central epistemological categories are inexorably tied to particular perspectives, it also 
follows that the oppressed can not criticize the powerful… unless we allow a “double 
standard: allow a questionable idea to be criticized if it is held by those in a position of 
power – Christian creationism, for example – but not if it is held by those whom the 
powerful oppress – Zuni creationism, for example” (ibid). 
• Constructivism is valuable in that it demonstrates the fact that society molds us in many 
ways, but if it molded us in all ways, and we are simply the “product of the blind forces 
of nature and society, then so is our view that we are only the product of the blind forces 
of nature and society. A radical sociology of knowledge is also self-refuting” (Sire, pp. 
236-237). 
• The idea that we have no access to reality and that we can only have stories is self-
referentially incoherent. It is an illogical axiom, or “put crudely, this idea cannot account 
for itself, for it tells us something that, on its own account, we can not know” (ibid). 
Likewise, if it is true that all discourse is a power play and should be questioned (a la 
Foucault) then should not that proposition also be questioned? For it only makes sense if 
that one sentence is excluded from being a power play (ibid, p. 236). 
• The answer to the question “Is Constructivism True?” can never be answered in the 
affirmative. From within the system, the constructivist accepts relativity, so it can be true 
(but only in a pragmatic sense; that it is instructive perhaps), but not True. From outside 
the system, no one would accept it as true without being subsumed by the system.  
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 Philosophical constructivism as a system is largely internally consistent in that it is strong 
enough to redefine everything according to the theory itself. But like any other worldview, it has 
certain basic propositions that are un-provable, that must be accepted simply on faith. One of the 
main problems with this worldview is that it terminates in the relativization of Truth to 
perspectival truths. There can be no True facts in this system, only pragmatic facts.  This is self-
refuting in that scientific data, argumentation, and logic are used to demonstrate and “sell” a 
worldview that denies the Truth of those types of arguments. Secondly, it is not ultimately a 
livable and viable system – hard sciences reject it outright as no facts can be generated in the 
system, no one can fly to moon if we socially construct physics. In the end an inability to 
determine what is True must inevitably result in a breakdown of culture as opposed to a 
protection of all from the power of others over them, as postmoderns typically seek (c.f. White, 
2007, p. 55-57). Knowledge is no longer seen a power; for the postmodern, truth is power. While 
it is important to be concerned with how Truth is used (i.e. Lincoln, Roosevelt, Hitler, Stalin, 
Mao, etc.) throwing out the concept of Truth altogether does not eliminate oppression, it merely 
changes the nature of it so that anything we dislike can be deemed oppressive, and still be called 
truth. 
Constructivism in Education 
 As any comprehensive theory or meta-narrative, constructivism has implications for other 
areas of life. In education, postmodern thinking has detrimental effects as truth and reality no 
longer exist other than in our perceptions and beliefs of that truth or reality.   Windschitl (1999) 
defines constructivism as the “belief that learners actively create, interpret, and reorganize 
knowledge in individual ways” (p. 151).  Similarly, Siegel argues that “knowledge is acquired 
through interactions with the environment”. Both of these theses in educational constructivism 
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have direct roots in philosophical postmodernism in the social constructivist vein. Referring back 
to previous discussions, philosophically, Modernism primarily appeals to rationalism, 
postmodernity primarily appeals to meaning. If an object or concept in one’s mind does not 
actually reflect some reality outside the mental concept, then interpretation and meaning become 
absolutely essential. If two people can have no actual common external reference point, then all 
communication is essentially pointless. But, as people do exist in society, and they have a 
pragmatic need to act as if things were commonly referable, people thusly do engage in social 
activity. To that end, education needs to be reconceived as “all knowledge is invented or 
‘constructed’ in the minds of learners. It can’t be any other way, postmodernists say, because the 
ideas teachers teach and students learn don’t correspond to any objective [external] reality” 
(DeLashmutt &  Braund, 1996, p. 99). Given the constructivist view of truth, the purpose of 
education takes two forms according to Vadeboncouer (1997), either to “educate the individual 
child in a manner which supports the child’s interests and needs” or “social transformation and 
the reconstruction of society aligned with democratic ideals” (p. 15). The first might be 
considered a less radical goal, but both of these goals are derived from an anti-realist view of 
truth. As mentioned previously, “knowledge, ideas, and language are created by people not 
because they are ‘true,’ but rather because the are useful” (DeLashmutt & Braund, p. 99).  
 For the constructivist, since learning only happens in the context of social interaction, and 
since teachers do not have “privileged relationship to truth” (ibid) constructivists advocate a 
radical departure from the Modernist idea of education. Bruffee (quoted in Petraglia, 1998, p. 95) 
states that “a social constructionist position in any discipline assumes that entities we normally 
call reality, knowledge, thought, facts, texts, selves, and so on are constructs generated by 
communities of like-minded peers”. Thusly,  
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knowledge arises through consensus rather than through correspondence with 
objective truth or in an individual’s autonomous construction of that reality. 
For educators… social constructionism seems a logical and complementary 
extension of constructivist learning theory especially as embodied in 
sociohistorist and second-wave cognitive schools of thought (Petraglia, pp. 
95-96).  
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The chart below, taken from DeLashmutt and Braund (1997, p. 97) 
demonstrate the shift in perspective in four important arenas; knowledge, 
culture, values, and human nature 
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Appendix A  
A Typical “Basic Questions” Chart 
 
 
Chart retrieved from http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/8/4/1/Figure5.jpg  
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